Procedural Learning and Reform in Federal Administrative Adjudication

Authors

Jeremy S. Graboyes, Administrative Conference of the United StatesFollow

Abstract

In the mid-twentieth century, in cases like Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court found a right to “some kind of hearing” in program after program and set about constructing a “fixed list of procedural protections required by due process.” Constitutionalizing procedural choices in this manner gave courts substantial control over how administrative adjudication operated. However, the approach was criticized. Dissenting in Goldberg, Justice Hugo Black wrote that by imposing significant procedural requirements on agencies without a clear constitutional or statutory basis for doing so, courts “wander[ed] out of their field of vested powers and transgress[ed] into the area constitutionally assigned to the Congress and the people.” Goldberg was also criticized on the grounds that courts were ill-equipped to undertake the kind of learning and reform required to manage complex programs of administrative adjudication. These criticisms reflect broader concerns that courts lack the democratic accountability and substantive expertise of the political branches.

Recommended Citation

Graboyes, Jeremy S. (2025) "Procedural Learning and Reform in Federal Administrative Adjudication," Widener Commonwealth Law Review: Vol. 34: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://cwldc.widener.edu/wclr/vol34/iss1/8